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Abstract
Korean automotive industry drew world’s attention as it grew to be the S’h largest
producing country in two decades as a later comer. Now it faces a transitory period as
domestic mmket growth drops to less than 5% despite more rapidly increasing over-
capacity and it has to cope with greater competition pressure in both domestic and
overseas markets. Change in domestic market directs Korean manufacturers in two ways:
to develop more of larger cars and various types of vehicles like RVS to meet customers’
preferences and to raise their competitiveness in price and quality to survive
unprecedented power struggle among new and incumbent players. It also has to pay
more heed to social voices. Energy waste, air pollution, and traffic congestion are getting
more chronic in Korea. To alleviate these problems Korea imposes the heaviest taxes on
automobiles and gasoline among major automobile producing countries..
Entering the ‘90s, exports of Korean-made cars rose rapidly for several reasons. Among
these were redoubled efforts to control quality, expansion of after sales service networks,
production of a wider range of export models, and more aggressive marketing efforts.
Perhaps most importantly of all, however, the rapid rise was also due to aggressive
efforts by Korean manufacturers to explore overseas markets. Korean-made cars are now
being exported to a greater number of countries than ever as a result, especially to
developing countries. The volume of exports did in fact rise substantially as export
markets became diversified, but the growth rates between regions has varied far too
greatly. This indicates that Korean manufacturers have not yet secured competitiveness
overseas. The rise in exports of Korean-made cars was greatly influenced by external
factors such as the appreciation of the Japanese Yen.
The trade imbalance of Korean auto industry drew attention from advanced countries.
After successive reductions, the tariff rates on imported cars in Korea now stand at 8%,
which is an even lower level than in the EU. In the wake of the trade negotiations between
Korea and the US in 1995, foreign auto manufacturers were given wider access to the
Korean market.
Korean auto manufacturers have been aggressive in recent years in expanding their
overseas operations. Each manufacturer is pursuing different strategies to advance
overseas to build local production operations.
1. Changes in Domestic Market

1.1 Sluggish domestic market
The Korean automotive industry faces new challenges as domestic demand growth has
slowed down significantly since 1994 while all of Korean auto makers try to expand their
production capacity aiming to be one of top 10 global makers in near future. In mid July
1997 vehicle registration reached 10 million units, doubling itself in about 4 years as was
5.2 million in 1992. However, with nation’s motorization approaching its final phase,
the growth rate of new car sales is expected to continue declining. The number of
passenger cars and commercial
about one vehicle for every 4.7
1996.
vehicles registered per 1,000 persons was 211 in 1996, or
persons. South Korea’s population was 45 million as of
<Table 1> Automobile Registration by Type, 1992-1996
(unit: thousand units, %)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average Annual Growth
cars 3,461 4,271 5,149 6,006 6,894 18.8%
Buses 484 528 582 613 663 8.2%
Trucks 1,286 1,475 1,673 1,850 1,996 11.6%
Total 5,231 6,274 7,404 8,469 9,553 16.2%
source: KAMA, Korean Automotive Industry, various issues
d!able 2> Automobile Ownership
(units per 1,000 persons)
Country Korea Japan Mexico Spain
Year 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1994 1994 1994
Vehicles 79,2 142.4 165.5 188.8 211.1 526.3 131.6 434.8
cars 48.4 97.1 115.8 133.9 152.4 344.8 89.3 357.1
source: ibid
In 1996, a total of 1.64 million new automobiles were sold on the domestic market, up
5.7% compared to the previous year. Domestic car sales were 1.24 million in 1996. The
domestic market had grown at a blistering pace in the late 1980’s. The annual growth rate
actually reached a record high of 45.8%J in 1989. Entering the 1990’s, however, the
growth rate has steadily slowed. Its was -O.1% in 1995, which was the first decline since
1980. The lower growth rate is largely the result of the domestic automobile market
maturation as cars have become a necessity of everyday life. Moreover, the terms of new
car sale become less favorable to new customers as more of used cars are now available at
cheaper price.
1.2 Intensification of Competition
There have been several major developments in the domestic automobile market. The
Korean government permitted Samsung’s entry into the passenger car business,
encouraging a greater deal of competition through both of globalization and deregulation.
More new models are introduced in the market by Korean auto makers.
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Source: Kia Economic Research Institute, Automotive Industry, July, 1997
Hyundai and Kia keep updating their full line of cars and vehicles. Daewoo Motor
rolled out 3 new models in the market in early 1997, its first own models after Daewoo
separated with GM in 1992 and so they are successful in picking up their market share
this year. Ssangyong have prepared to introduce their first passenger car into the market
late in 1997. Samsung will start to sell their cars from March in 1998. Although the
domestic market growth dampened already, the market is destined to witness continuous
increase in supply, meaning tough competition among makers.
1.3 Shifts in Demand
The ratio of commercial vehicle sales to total sales had gradually fallen from 34% in 1990
to 259Z0in 1996. In 1996, consumers continued to show decreasing preference for small
cars. Sales of light cars exploded in 1996 as the government policy of preferential tax for
light cars took effective from late 1995. As personal income level goes upwards,
customers are looking for more of larger cars, medium and large sized cars. In 1996, it
was also notable that the ratio of sports utility, jeep, and other multipurpose vehicles went
high to 8.5%.
<Table 4> Domestic Sal
(Unit) Light
Small
Medium
Large
RV
Total
(% Share) Light
Small
Medium
Large
RV
Total
~of Passen
380,911
206,510
16,817
21,888
626,126
60.8
33.0
2.7
3.5
100.0
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527,352
467,822
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2.8
8.5
100.0
Source : KAMA, Monthly Automobile Statistics.
note : 1) Lights: -800cc, Small: under 1,500cc, Medium: under 2,000cc, Large: over 2,000cc
2) RV includes all Jeep-types and mini van(Santamo)
The Korean auto makers sell most of their cars and vehicles through direct marketing
channels of their own. The direct marketing channel system is still at the heart of
distribution in Korea even though some of the auto makers have established independent
auto sales companies or have introduced dealership networks to promote sales. The
dealership system is not yet prevalent in Korea. However, more dealerships will be
established in the near future.
1.4 Capacity expansion and industry restructuring
Korean automotive industry drew attention as it continued to increase its production
capacity. Its capacity utilization rate also rose as domestic demand exploded from late
1980’s and exports grew rapidly in mid 1990’s. Each maker envisaged its plan to be a
global volume maker among optimism and suspicion. Korean auto industry had been
successful to increase both its capacity and the utilization rate.
~able 5> Production capacity and utilization
(unit: 1,000 units , %)
1985 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Capacity 642 2,065 2,795 2,874 3,055 3,366 3,525
Production 378 1,270 1,689 1,985 2,261 2,524 2,811
Utilization 58.9 66.7 60.4 69.1 73.6 75.0 79.7
Source: Kia Economic Research Institute, 1997 Korean Automotive Mushy, 1997
According to the forecasting report by a foreign forecasting unit, annual production
capacity of Korean auto industry will rise to 6.4 million units in 2001. It is overestimated.
The estimate is based on Korean makers’ long term plans outlined 3 or 4 years ago when
each maker still believed that it had to increase the capacity not to drop out of the scale
race.
However, as its utilization rate fell in the first half of 1997, the industry is now facing the
environment that each maker has to readjust its original plan to cut back the future capacity
if it is to avoid huge loss. To be worse, the financial structure of Korean makers has not
improved over years. Taking into consideration the market demand for Korean cars and
vehicles, domestic and abroad, the optimal industry scale is believed to be 5 million units
in 2000. So it is more likely that the capacity remains far less than 6 million in 2001.
<Table 6> Ratios of assets, liabilities and equity( 1995)
Stockholders’ equity to current ratio fixed ratio I
I total assets I I I I
Hyundai 22.2 79.8 252.5 349.7
Kia 20.9 71.4 288.5 378.1
Daewoo 11.8 82.0 419.2 744.5
5 Korean makers 17.8 81.1 304.0 460.6
Japanese makers 48.7 120.1 34.5 105.2
It is also possible that despite skepticism, Korean auto makers do not change their
strategy to expand their capacity but instead enter a dogfight with each other, resulting
with some inevitable loser. Most Korean car manufacturers, belong to chdml(corporate
group), so they may run such a race in times of financial difficulty. Kia Motors is not in
this group, however.
1.5 Tax increase and government regulations
Korean automobile tax system may be one of the most complicated and heavy in the
world. Consumers are required to pay various types of taxes in order to purchase and
drive a car: These include the acquisition tax, registration tax, license tax, and the special
commodity tax on vehicle and gasoline.
With the number of cars registered increasing rapidly since the late 1980’s, the revenue
derived from auto-related taxes has increased substantially. Automobile taxes now
account for 15% of the nation’s total tax receipts, a figure which is much higher than that
for Japan where such taxes account for about 8% of the nation’s total tax revenue.
Considering the fact that there are far fewer cars registered per thousand persons in Korea
as compared Japan, the tax burden on car owners is very heavy in Korea.
The Korean government levies such high tax rates because it wants to encourage energy
conservation in addition to curbing spending on luxury goods. Accordingly, bigger cars
which consumes larger amounts of fuel and which have higher sticker prices are subject
to higher tax rates. As heavy as these taxes may be, however, they
and imported foreign cars on equal terms. Outside of import tariffs,
argued that foreign cars are treated unfairly in the domestic market.
apply to both Korean
it therefore cannot be
<Table 7> Automobile Tax System
Classification Time of Collection Items Subject to Tax Tax Rates
National Taxes
Special Commodity Tax Purchase Passenger cars 10-20% of factory price
(SCT) according to displacement
Education Tax to Purchase Passenger cars 30% of Special
Special Commodity Tax Commodity Tax
Value-addedTax Purchase All automobiles 10% of auto price
Transportation Tax Operation Gasoline 414 wonli
Diesel 48 WO1l/1
Education Tax to Operation Oil 1590of Transportation Tax
Transportation Tax
Value-addedTax Operation Oil 1090of oil price
Local Taxes
Acquisition Tax Registration All Automobiles
Special Tax for Registration All Automobiles
Agriculture & Fkhery
Registration Tax Registration All Automobiles
Education Tax to Registration All Automobiles
Registration Tax
Automobile Tax Ownership All Automobiles
Education Tax to Ownership All Automobiles
Automobile Tax
Licence Tax Ownership All Automobiles
29?0of auto price
10% of Acquisition Tax
2-59Z0of auto price
20% of Registration Tax
Fixed amount according
to displacement and use
of automobile
309?0of Automobile Tax
Fixed amount according
to displacement and use
of automobile
Others
Public bond Registration All Automobiles 1-20% of Sale-price and
displacement
Environment Ownership Diesel-powered Basic charges plus
Improvement Charge Automobiles surcharge
Note: As of May, 1997.
The raising of transport taxes and collection of traffic congestion tolls are both intended to
restrict the use of cars. Transportation taxes levied without exception on ail car owners
who insist on driving.
<Table 8> Comparison of Taxes on Passenger Cars in Major
Komxi Japan
Factory price 100 100
Purchase Special consumption tax 10 Y,
Education tax on SCT 3 -
Value-addedtax 11.3 -
Sub-total 24.3 3
Registration Subway bond 11,2 -
Registration tax(RT) 6.2 -
Education tax on RT 1.2 -
Acquisition tax 2.5 5.2
Sub-total 21.1 5.2
Total including taxes 145.4 108.2
Source : KAMA, Korean Automotive Industry, 1995.
Notes : 1) Based on 1.5 liter car 2) a) Consumption tax, b) Sales tax, t
;ountries
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2. International trade and Globalization of Korean automotive industty
2.1 Exports
Entering the ‘90s, exports of Korean-made cars rose rapidly for several reasons. Among
these were redoubled efforts to control quality, expansion of after sales service networks,
production of a wider range of export models, and more aggressive marketing efforts.
Perhaps most importantly of all, however, the rapid rise was also due to aggressive
efforts by Korean manufacturers to explore overseas markets. Korean-made cars are now
being exported to a greater number of countries than ever as a result, especially to
developing countries.
Car markets in developing countries are growing fast in line with the rapid economic
growth, and these countries are widely expected to have enormous market potential in the
future. Furthermore, as consumers in developing countries are more sensitive to price
than quality compared with consumers in advanced countries, Korean manufacturers can
advance into markets in developing countries relatively more easily. Considering that
Korean-made cars have price competitiveness over those made by advanced
manufacturers, Korean manufacturers have focused more heavily on markets in
developing countries than on advanced countries’ markets or in markets where small-car
demand is high. This explains the rapid rise in exports in such a short time. In Europe,
Korean manufacturers concentrated on Western European markets where demand for
low-priced small-sized cars was rising rapidly.
The diversification of export markets for Korean-made cars can be explained by the
fluctuations in exports by region. Exports to North America, which used to account for
more than 80910of Korea’s total exports during the ‘80s, fell off at an average rate of
1.9’ZOannually during the period from 1990 to 1996. Accordingly, the share of exports to
North America out of the industry’s total exports dropped from 72% in 1990, to 50910in
1991, 20% in 1993, and finally to 18.5% in 1996.
Exports to Western Europe, on the other hand, rose sharply entering into the ’90s.
Exports to Western Europe were a mere 20,000 units in 1990, but in 1992, exports to the
region exceeded 100,000 units. In 1995, exports to Eastern Europe surpassed exports to
North America, and in 1996, exports to Western Europe were recorded at 300,000 units.
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Source : KAMA, Monthly Automobile Statistics.
During the 1992-1995 period, the annual average growth rate of exports to Western
Europe was 54.6%, and Western Europe’s share of Korea’s total exports rose sharply to
25. 1% in 1995 from only 6.4% in 1990.
Exports to Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Pacific region
have registered remarkable growth rates of 40-70% annually. Accordingly, the export
shares of these regions were 9-14% of the total in 1996, compared with below 5% in
1990. Exports to the Asian region have grown steadily to 63,000 units in 1996 from
33,000 units in 1990, an average annual growth rate of 11.2%. However, Asia’s share
of the total exports declined to 5.270 in 1996 from 9.6?6 in 1990 because exports to other
regions have surged at even faster rates.
flable 10> Ex~orts bv Destination
(Unit) N. America
W. Europe
E. Europe
Africa
Asia
Middle East
Pacific
Latin America
Total
(%Shae) N. America
W. Europe
E. Europe
Atiica
Asia
Middle East
Pacific
Latin America
Total
251,183
19,364
9,505
5,733
33,544
6,442
13,123
8,206
347,100
72.4
5.6
2.7
1.6
9.7
1.8
3.8
2.4
100.0
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Source : KAMA, Monthly Automobile Statistics.
note : Excludes KD kits and Jindo specialty vehicles except 1990.
All considered, the rise in exports of Korean-made cars is largely due to the industry’s
efforts to develop new markets by taking advantage of the competitive edge which Korean
auto makers managed to secure. With the volume of exports rising, the shares of the three
biggest export markets dropped to the 57% level in 1996 from the 88% level in 1990.
The fact that Korean manufacturers are becoming less dependent on specific markets
implies that diversification of export markets has served as a major factor behind the rapid
rise in exports of Korean-made cars.
Export shares by region differ among the three major manufacturers. Hyundai’s share
of exports to advanced countries including North America and Western Europe out of its
total exports is on the decline. Kia’s shares of exports to advanced countries and
developing countries have changed very little, while Daewoo sharply increased its share
of total exports to advanced countries recently.
Since the beginning of the ‘90s, Hyundai’s exports to North America have been sluggish,
below the level at the end of the ‘80s, while its exports to Western Europe have been
rising rapidly. Hyundai’s exports to Western Europe rose to 156,000 units in 1996, a
sharp increase of 24.8?Z0 annually during the period from 1991 to 1996. Nonetheless,
Hyundai’s rise in exports in the ’90s has been led by exports to developing countries
rather than advanced countries. Hyundai’s shipments to the Middle East, the Pacific
region, and the Latin America rose sharply to 64,000 units in 1996 from 6,000 units in
1990. The combined share of these regions of Hyundai’s total exports rose sharply to
11.6% in 1996 from 2.6910in 1991.
Exports to the Pacific region and Latin America registered a remarkable average annual
growth rate of 40-50% during the same period. Thus, Hyundai’s exports are classified as
either those going to advanced countries or those going to developing countries. The
share of exports to advanced countries continued to decline during the period, dropping to
53% of the total exports in 1996, from 71% in 1992, and above 80% at the end of the
‘80s.
At Kia, exports to advanced countries and developing countries are both on a rapid rise.
No changes were seen in each group’s share of the total. on the US market, despite the
decline in Kia’s OEM exports for Ford, exports of the Sephia under the Kia name have
been doing well. Kia’s marketing functions have been further strengthened in the
advanced countries’ auto markets. It even established an independent sales network in
Western Europe in 1995. Thanks to these marketing efforts, the share of Kia’s exports
to advanced countries remained at 50% of its total exports during the entire period, except
for 1993. Exports to developing countries, mainly in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin
America, have been rising at almost the same rate as those to advanced countries.
Of developing countries, countries in Asia and Latin America have emerged as major
export markets for Korean-made cars. Exports to Asia and Latin America registered a
high annual growth rate of 60-70%. It is noted that a high percentage of Kia’s total
exports are OEM exports, which is a major reason why its exports to advanced countries
have been strong.
Daewoo’s OEM exports declined sharply after it severed ties with GM. Its export share
to advanced countries out of its total dropped sharply in 1993 as a result. However, in
1995, after restrictions on exports of Daewoo cars to Western Europe were lifted,
Daewoo’s exports to advanced countries rose sharply. Even so, compared with Hyundai
and Kia, Daewoo’s export share to developing countries out of its total is relatively very
high. Daewoo’s exports to North America stopped in 1994 with the discontinuation of
its OEM exports for GM. Exports to Western Europe, on the other hand, posted
tremendous growth. Daewoo exported 100,000 units to Western Europe in 1995,
compared with 12,000 units in 1994. The share of Daewoo’s exports to advanced
countries rose to 32.6% in 1996 from 7.9% in 1993.
Daewoo’s exports to developing countries registered high growth of 77% annually from
1991 to 1996. Thanks to this strong performance, Daewoo overtook Kia as the second
largest exporter next to Hyundai. Daewoo has been most successful in the Eastern
European market. Its exports to this region grew at the astonishing rate of 552% annually
from 1991 to 1996.
<Table 11s Exports by Type
,>.;-.
I I I I I
(Unit) Export Total 346,975 638,492 737,856 1,083,157 1,412,274
cars 288,826 509,614 604,315 856,368 1,056,400
Cvs 7,303 65,100 87,721 122,200 153,731
cm 50,846 63,778 45,820 104,589 202,143
(%Chage) Export Total -2.4 40,0 15.6 46.8 30.4
cars -11.7 31.0 18.6 41.7 23.4
Cvs -11.1 128.2 34.7 39.3 25.8
CKD 152.2 -28.2 128.3 93.3
(%Shae) Export Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
cars 83.2 79.8 81.9 79.1 74.8
Cvs 2.1 10.2 11.9 11.3 10.9
CKD 14.7 10.0 6.2 9.6 14.3
Source : KAMA, Monthly Automobile Statistics.
note : Excludes Jindo specialty vehicles.
In other regions, Daewoo’s presence was very strong, too, registering a rate of growth in
exports at 20-23090 a year.
Efforts of the industry to expand exports, particularly efforts to diversify export
markets, among others, have led to the rise in exports of Korean-made cars in the ‘90s.
However well the auto makers have been performing, there are a number of problems
which must be addressed in order to ensure steady expansion of exports in the future.
The volume of exports did in fact rise substantially as export markets became
diversified, but the growth rates between regions has varied far too greatly. This
indicates that Korean manufacturers have not yet secured competitiveness overseas. The
rise in exports of Korean-made cars was greatly influenced by external factors such as the
appreciation of the Japanese Yen. This is a precarious situation to say the least when it is
considered that the Korean manufacturers are turning to the export market out of necessity
to offset sluggish domestic sales.
It should also be noted that the sharp rise in exports of Korean-made cars to Western
Europe can lead to problems if the competitiveness of Korean-made cars has not yet been
firmly recognized on the market.
Excessive expansion of exports without first achieving sufficient competitiveness can
mean steep declines in exports afterwards. This was something which was learned in
painful fashion by Hyundai in North America at the end of the ‘80s. Furthermore, with
Korean-made cars accounting for higher and higher shares of the market in Western
Europe, threats to continued exports have become more pronounced. Among other
things, more import restrictions on Korean cars have been put in place, and there have
been more anti-dumping appeals.
The fact that the number of export models is limited is another problem which needs to be
addressed. Of course, only one or two leading models can be selected to compete with
foreign models on overseas markets when manufacturers advance into new markets for
the first time, but for a country with exports exceeding one million units, the lack in the
number of models would seem to bode poorly for expansion of exports in the future.
2.2 Imports
. Sales of imported cars on the domestic market registered an increase of 49% to 10,315
units in 1996 from a year earlier. Likewise, the aggregate market share of imports in the
domestic market rose to 0.8% in 1996 from 0.6% in 1995. In the wake of the trade
conflicts between Korea and the US in 1995, foreign auto manufacturers were given
wider access to the Korean market. The market expanded further because foreign
manufacturers began to introduce low-priced models.
Sales of imports priced less than 20 million won rose sharply in 1996. Sales by engine
displacement showed that the market share of cars with 2 liter or smaller engines dropped
slightly, while sales of cars in the range between 2 liters and 3 liters increased sharply by
48.7$Z0. The market share of cars priced lower than 20 million won rose sharply
compared with the year before, and the market share of those priced above 50 million
won remained about the same. The market share of cars in the price range of 30 to 50
million won dropped, however. All told, the expansion of the imported car market in
Korea in 1996 was led by low-priced models.
Looking at foreign car sales by country of origin, the market share of US-made cars rose
while that of European-made cars dropped. A total of 3,894 US-made cars were sold,
posting an increase of 51 Yoin 1996 from a year earlier. This growth came from strong
sales of the Chrysler Stratus and Neon, both priced at about 20 million won, and the low-
priced Ford Mondeo. This success was attributed by many to the US manufacturers’
efforts to enter the Korean market by introducing low-priced cars.
European-made cars registered an increase in sales of 41 .9%, a figure below the average
growth rate of total imports to Korea. A total of 6,135 European-made cars were sold in
1996. Sales of Mercedes-Benz, Peugeot, Volvo were sluggish, while BMW,
Volkswagen, and Audi performed well. BMW and Mercedes-Benz, both German
manufacturers of luxury cars, performed very differently. BMW recorded astonishing
sales growth of 102.7% while sales of Mercedes-Benz rose by a mere 14.1 ‘?40. As for
Japanese makers, 286 units of Japanese cars imported from the Japanese transplants in
US(A ban on imports of built-up cars from Japan remains in place) were sold.
2.3 Trade issues
After Korea-US automobile
more widely open to imports.
trade negotiation in 1995, the domestic market got much
The import tariff rates and acquisition tax rates on imported
luxury cars were lowered significantly and foreign makers were granted greater freedom
to advertise their products on television. In addition, the previous limits on the maximum
number and size of sales locations (20 locations, 3,000 square meters) that each foreign
maker could manage were completely removed.
<Table 13> Tariff Rates on Imported Cars in Korea
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Rate(%) 60 50 30 25 20 20 17 15 10 8
Source: KAMA, Korean Automotive Industry, selected years
flable 14s Automobile import duty and trade restriction in major countries
(unit: % )
import duty contents of other import restriction
cars Cvs
USA 2.5 25 t None
Canada 8.0 8.0 t None. But duties for cars and vehicles manufactured
in USA and Mexico are 1.8% and 23% by NAITA
EU 10 10.4-22 ~ None. But UK, Spain, France and Italy impose VER
on
Japan o 0 Japanese imports.
t None
Korea 8 8 t Import Origin Diversification on Japanese imports.
China 100-120 25-30 t Imports is allowed only to those with import permit
Thailand 42-68.5 60 t Sales tax of 35.75-41 .8% on car imports
Mexico 20 20 t Import permit only to local manufacturers in Mexico
Brazil 70 70 t Preferential duty of 35% for local manufacturers.
t Imports from Japan, Korea, and EU are regulated by
quota and levied imports duty of 3590
. . .. ---- .
Source: Daily Auto News, Automotive Industry Handbook, 1997, Japan
Note: Tariff rates are as of August 1996.
The Korea-US trade talks in 1995 had three major ramification. First of all, Korea, by
agreeing to permit discussion of its tax system during the negotiations, provided the
opportunity for the US to press Korea even more intensely in the future. Second, by
reducing the special consumption tax and auto taxes on large-sized cars, the retail prices,
and registration and operation costs were reduced substantially. The consumer prices at
the time of purchase and registration was down 4.9% and auto taxes during operation was
down by $400-$500 for 2.5 liter car, by $1,200 for 3.0 liter car annually.
Third, as costs for the purchase and operation of large-sized cars have been reduced, the
shift in domestic demand towards larger cars will no doubt accelerate. As there is no
longer any discrimination against imported cars, there will likely be a steep rise in
imports. The tariff rates on imported cars in Korea were 60% in 1986, when the
government permitted the importation of foreign cars for the first time. After successive
reductions, they now stand at 8%, which is an even lower level than in the EU. Other
major developing countries producing cars impose much heavier tariffs beginning at 20%
in Mexico and going as high as 100-120% in China.
Korea’s ratio of exports to total production was 439% in 1996. It is below average of
major auto producing countries. USA and Brazil have big local market and so their
export ratios are quite low while European countries show high export ratios because of
,., .,, ., -T,,,
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<Table 15> New car exports by country
Country
Belgium
Sweden
Mexico
Spain
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
UK
Korea
Japan
Brazil
USA
(unit : thous
Productions
1,291.8
435.0
1,080.8
2,142.3
2,321.7
3,558.4
4,356.1
1,534.5
1,694.6
2,311.7
10,554.1
1,582.9
12,262.7
1994
Exports
1,215.7
346.1
559.1
1,588.1
1,752.9
2,157.4
2,410.3
669.6
718.2
737.9
4,460.3
379.3
1,086.6
Export Ratio
94.1
79.6
51.7
74.1
75.5
60.6
55.3
43.6
42.4
31,9
42.3
24.0
8.9
Id units, %)
Productions
1,234
463
1,211
2,412
2,142
3,591
4,843
1,545
1,924
2,813
10,346
1,812
11,796
1995
Exports
1,193
406
975
1,924
1,731
2,272
2,842
799
1,021
1,210
3,711
306
1,051
Export Ratio
96.7
87.7
80.5
79.8
80.8
63.3
58.7
51.7
53.1
43.0
35.9
16.9
8.9
Source: KAMA, Korean Automotive Industry, 1997
Trade in world car market has been dominated by a handful of countries. Top ten auto
exporting countries take up more than 90% of world auto exports in 1993. Korea ranked
12* in 1993 and Korea’s share in world auto exports was only 1.5%. As Korea’s
exports grew so fast recently, however, the trade imbalance in Korean auto industry drew
attention from advanced countries. Korea exports autos and auto parts of 12 billion
dollars in 1996 with trade surplus of 11 billion dollars.
Trade of advanced countries is better explained by the theory of intra-industry trade rather
than the theory of inter-industry trade, stemmed from the difference in input factors
available in countries. The theory of intra-industry trade means that the trade occurs
because the industry in other countries may differ in scale economy and monopolistic
power.
<Table 16> Automotive exports, imports and trade balance of major countries( 1993)
Japan
Germany
USA
Canada
France
Belgium
UK
Spain
Italy
Sweden
Mexico
Netherlands
Austria
Korea
Brazil
Total
3Q!S
80,157
59,993
44,603
36,122
24,190
18,401
13,479
14,182
11,678
6,540
8,394
3,668
3,942
4,956
3,095
333,400
.&2!?&
6,452
37,901
84,085
29,115
20,639
14,954
21,605
13,230
20,364
3,557
8,579
7,844
6,544
1,189
1,120
277,130
unit: million dollars, IZO
~
cars
58.8
58.7
33.2
52.7
50.8
79.7
48.4
70.1
42.0
45.7
50.0
38.4
22.6
78.4
19.3
53.5
m breakd
Cvs
14.0
8.7
11.5
24.2
7.7
7.7
11.6
7.3
14.3
19.3
8.0
31.1
17.1
11.9
28.4
12.9
m
Qil!&_
27.2
32.7
55.3
23.1
42.0
12.6
39.9
22.6
43.7
35.1
41.9
30.6
60.2
9.7
52.3
33.6
vehicles
53,176
14,076
-38,850
14,970
-1,574
8,952
-5,060
3,718
-11,365
2,231
4,159
-3,476
-3,501
4,331
n.a.
ade balancl
Parts
20,529
8,016
-632
-7,963
5,125
-5,505
-3,066
-2,766
2,679
752
-4,344
-700
899
-564
n.a.
total
73,705
22,092
-39,482
7,007
3,551
3,447
-8,126
952
-8,686
2,983
-185
-4,176
-2,602
3,767
n.a.
Source : United Nations, International Trade Statistics Yearbook 1993.
Korea Trade Association, Trade Statistics, 1993.
Note: cars are classified in SITC 781, CVS in SITC 782,78 and parts in SITC 784,7132,7783
The automotive industry is such a good example that we can observe active intra-
industry trade as products differentiation has evolved well in final cars and vehicles and as
a host of parts are supplied from parts suppliers to auto makers. High RtkD costs for
developing a variety of new models and parts constitutes fixed costs to be the most
important source of scale economy and monopolistic power. International division of
labor also follows between advanced and developing countries in the area of
manufacturing and R&D.
The differences in the level of technology and wage brings about such division of labor
that advanced firms provide companies in developing countries with technologies for
product development and manufacturing as well as with capital equipment and core parts.
Then they combine these with low-wage labor to assemble the final cars. Korea is a
typical example where a less-developed country has adopted such a strategy of importing
foreign technology to combine with its low wage labor. In this way, it could specialize in
assembling small passenger cars.
Korean auto industry lacked in technologies, capital equipment, parts industry and etc.
However, Korea had an automotive superpower, Japan, in neighborhood. So Korean
auto industry could grow depending on Japan in securing technologies, core parts, and a
considerable part of capital equipment.
In 1980’s, Korea could increase its exports to US market where quota like voluntary
exports restraint(VER) was imposed on Japanese passenger cars and US auto makers
made strategic alliances with Korean makers, rendering Korea a manufacturing base for
US small cars.
-dable 17> Technological Licenses in Automotive industry by Partner country
us Japan UK Germany
1992 I Vehicles 21 38 20 4
Parts 42 119 9 33
Sum 63 157 37 37
Share 20.1 50.2 9.3 11.8
1995 Vehicles 16 42 14 5
Parts 38 93 6 34
Sum 54 135 20 39
Share 14.9 49.8 7.4 14.4
(unit: # cases,%)
-
=++
17 220
27 313
8.6 100.0
6 83
17 I 188 I
Unlike Belgium, Spain, Canada and Mexico in which multi-national corporations
dominate local auto industry, Korean government pursued the localization policy to prop
up the parts industry. In 1992 Korea experienced a surplus of 4.3 billion dollars in
vehicle trade while in parts industry it had deficit only of 564 thousand dollars. In 1996
Korean auto exports jumped to 12 billion dollar and imports to 0.85 billion, yielding trade
surplus of 11.15 billion dollars. This figure does overestimate the potential of Korean
auto industry. Looking at Korea’s technological licenses from other countries, we can
see its auto industry still falls behind Japan, US, and Germany. This tells us that despite
of rapid growth in quantity, Korean auto industry has a long way to enhance its
technological level inferior to advanced countries.
2.4 Globalization
Korean auto manufacturers have been aggressive in recent years in expanding their
overseas operations. Kia entered the Indonesian car market in a joint venture for a national
car project, Hyundai advanced into the Indian market, and Daewoo’s local production
plants in Poland, Uzbekistan, and Romania started full-scale operations. Korean auto
makers, with full intentions of becoming among the global top ten by early next century,
are now entering a new phase where all efforts are based on global management. Each
manufacturer is pursuing different strategies to advance overseas to build local production
operations. Hyundai, among others, formulated its own comprehensive globalization
strategy, and this plan is quite a departure from its past strategies which focused on KD
kit assembly.
Hyundai is planning to establish a comprehensive local production system
parts and components manufacturing in countries with big markets and great
Hyundai will pursue this plan independently on its own.
<Table 18> Overseas production capacity by maker
including
potential.
(unit: thousand units)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Hyundai 130 55 79 100 170 290
Kia 73 73 128 138 228 348
Daewoo o 0 182 580 831 1,033
Total 203 128 389 818 1,229 1,671
Daewoo, which has been the most aggressive of all Korean manufacturers in pursuing
its globalization strategy, is advancing into foreign market either by constructing a local
plant with a production capacity of 200,000 units per year or in joint ventures with local
firms. Kia, on the other hand, is expected make a big change in its globalization strategy
now that it is participating in the Indonesian national CM project. Nevertheless, KD kit
assembly at local plants overseas is still an important part of its overseas operations.
Globalization of Korean makers is not limited to manufacturing. A global R&D system
is also being built. Kia expanded and reorganized the Kia Japan Research Institute and
established the Kia Tokyo R&D Center. Kia has established mutually cooperative
relations with the Detroit Research Institute and LA Design Research Institute. Hyundai
established a technology research institute in the US in 1986, the first of any of the
Korean automakers to do so. By establishing an R&D center in Frankfurt in 1994 to
develop technology and products suitable for European market, Hyundai established its
own global R&D network linking the US, Japan and Europe.
Daewoo has been strengthening its mutual cooperative ties by linking the Worthing
Technology Center, which it has acquired from the IDA Group of UK, and the Munich
Research Institute in Germany.
Korean three automakers have been establishing global sourcing network linking the
US, Japan and Germany. Kia set up a parts and components R&D network linking
research institutes in Detroit, KME in Germany and the Tokyo R&D Center. Kia has a
plan to build a sourcing network in Indonesia in cooperation with its suppliers. Daewoo is
establishing a production and supply system for parts and components in those
developing countries into which it has already advanced. Engines will be supplied from
India, small press devices from Romania, large press devices from Uzbekistan and
Czech, and six core parts including engines and transmissions will come from China and
will be supplied to the East Asian region. Hyundai also plans to build parts plants in
those developing countries it has advanced into in order to supply parts to its local plants.
